‘Fire danger along the tracks in this general area should have been known to BNSF,’ reads report
A Washington DNR report has found that debris from this locomotive engine (here in Great Falls, Montana, 2007) may have started the Tunnel 5 Fire. Photo: Robert Thompson/Flickr
By Chuck Thompson. September 11, 2023. On July 2, just east of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) Tunnel 5 in Skamania County, Wash., a blaze eventually designated as the Tunnel 5 Fire was ignited.
Burning adjacent to heavily traveled Washington State Route 14 in the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area, the fire consumed more than 500 acres and destroyed 10 structures, most of them private residences.
Now a State of Washington Department of Natural Resources wildland fire investigation report obtained by Columbia Insight has pinpointed debris from brakes and carbon emission particles from a BNSF locomotive engine as the cause of the blaze.
“A BNSF train travelled through the origin area of the Tunnel 5 fire at aprx 1053 to 1100 hours on Sunday, 07/02/23,” reads the DNR report. “This train emitted some object(s) which started fire in 3 areas over an aprx 690-foot distance, all on the North side of the tracks and East of Tunnel 5
“No probable evidence of another Human fire cause was located in the origin areas.”
The 22-page report includes photographs taken by citizen onlookers, surveillance video, witness testimony and interviews with BNSF officials.
“After eliminating other probable causes for this fire, the Wildland Fire Investigation determined this fire was started by Human means: Railroad Operations; Right of Way Vegetation Maintenance; Wheel Lubrication Parts; and Exhaust Particles,” the report concludes.
DNR approved the report on August 25.
According to the InciWeb page, the Tunnel 5 Fire is still under investigation. InciWeb is a multi-governmental, interagency all-risk incident information management system.
Older engine may be to blame
As stated in the report, DNR investigators focused on BNSF operations as the cause of the fire for a variety of reasons.
One of the the more compelling sections of the report focuses on testimony from a pair of train enthusiasts, a man and his son, who happened to be photographing trains moving through the Gorge on the morning of the fire.
“They spotted an old BNSF green and white locomotive leader engine with a newer orange and black engine behind it. The older lead engine had the number 2322 on it, and the newer orange and black engine had the number 2600. These engines were pulling 12-15 loaded cars which appeared to have lumber on them. This train was WB [westbound] from White Salmon, going toward Vancouver, WA,” reads the report.
This image was captured by an Amtrak train’s forward-facing camera about two and a half hours before the start of the Tunnel 5 Fire. SOA indicates “Specific Origin Area” of the fire. A note in the bottom right corner indicates the area where a small fire burned just days before the Tunnel 5 Fire. Photo: Wash. DNR
According to the man interviewed, who happens to be a railroad employee, the green and white engine (2322) was possibly more than 40 years old and was likely non-turbocharged.
“In his experience with Union Pacific (UP) this green and white engine is not commonly used on open tracks in the Columbia River Gorge area,” reads the DNR report. “Being a non-turbocharged engine, it has a high likelihood of emitting diesel carbon emissions from the exhaust which could start a fire. [The man] added that it was UP practice to not use these older non-turbocharged engines in the Columbia Gorge during summer months due to their propensity to start fires. UP primarily used these older engines within train yards/depots, and not out on open tracks in summer months.”
While conducting an on-the-ground inspection after the fire, the lead DNR investigator “noticed a lot of what appeared to be metallic pieces of varying size, many of which had sheared off or had sharply cut fine shiny edges.
“I later learned from the BNSF that these shiny metallic looking pieces were a solid polymer lubricating pad which rubs against the moving train wheels … I collected a total of 72 solid polymer pads and 2 possible carbon emission particles.” [This original wording of this passage has been slightly amended. —Editor]
Smaller railroad fires just days before
The DNR report includes photographs and testimony from numerous witnesses who called 911 within minutes of the start of the blaze.
The report digs deeper into railroad operations in the general and specific areas of where DNR says the fire began.
And it identifies other fires started by the railroad in the same area in the week leading up the Tunnel 5 blaze.
Hilltop house burns above Columbia River during the Tunnel 5 Fire in July 2023. Photo: Jurgenhessphotography
“Additionally, BNSF track maintenance activities had ignited two other fires in the same vicinity just 5 and 8 days earlier. These two track maintenance fires occurred during hours of darkness when temperatures would have been cooler and humidity higher. A localized fire danger along the tracks in this general area should have been known to BNSF,” reads the report.
DNR says that its Tunnel 5 Fire report is preliminary.
In 2007, the Broughton Fire burned 200 acres and seven structures (including five houses) in the precise location as the Tunnel 5 Fire.
That fire was determined to have been caused by the BNSF Railway Company’s grinding of nearby railroad tracks.
“Track grinding” or “rail grinding” repairs deformities and corrosion of rail tracks due to heavy use. The process creates sparks that can lead to fires, especially in the dry brush that lines the tracks in summer.
Thank you for your reporting on this important issue.
This incident fits a broader pattern of lax safety, inadequate inspections, and deferred equipment maintenance by the major railroad carriers, as reported by ProPublica today in this article:
https://www.propublica.org/article/union-pacific-federal-railroad-administration-unsafe-trains
BNSF told our Port of Vancouver Commissioners that they are all about RR safety when they were pushing the Tesoro Savage oil terminal – at the same time their lobbyist was working to stop safety braking systems in WA D/C – much appreciation for investigative reporting, which is becoming a rarity in today’s media coverage that so often prints industry press releases as “news” without fact checking and a deeper dive. Please continue what you are doing!
Thank you for your reporting, shared by Jean Avery.
Bravo, Chuck. You and Insight are doing a great job. Too bad other local “news” media pale by comparison. The public needs/wants this sort of accurate, objective reporting. Keep up the good work.
That kind of train started at least 5 fires on I84 years ago. I was driving west, back from the airport, and saw a small fire next to the tracks just after the lane from 205 joins 84. No cell phone then…. My first exit was to Halsey/Caesar Chavez/Sandy Blvd. By the time I found someone open to call 911, the fires were all going. I was told the west-most of them was near the Interstate 5; I saw one fire climbing bushes right up the road cut below the Providence hospital office buildings west of NE 46 Avenue – before I could take that first exit. Portland was lucky that day. All our piles of rotting campsites, construction discards, and old bags of trash could have been better fuel for those hot cinder time bombs
Thank you for your excelent investigative journalism on ths subject of the Tunnel 5 Fire in Underwood.
As I suspected the fires were started fron the railroad specificially the BNSF. In 2007 I experienced large chunks of embers falling on my deck as the Broughton Fire raged up the natural fire chimney up the cliffs of Underwood. As a former firefighter (Forest Service) I understand fire behaviour and all the implications of indefensible space.
During the Tunnel 5 fire I experienced large chunks of bark, fine branches and burning recognizable leaves of aerial debis from the fire raining down on my yard deck and roof. I was 1 mile away from the leading edge of the fire at that point July 2, 2023. We were ordered to evacuate on July 2nd, and after many attempts to find out the official word for evacuation I finally evacuated.
The truama associate with this fire and all the damages sustained is going to be an ongoing subject in the future.
How do we mitigate these disasters? Can we hold the railroads culpable for damages? How is this disaster going to raise our insurance rates in Underwood? These are some of the burning questions.
Grateful for the information. Thank you
The information regarding the BNSF locomotives is wrong. The “lead” unit (2322) was built in December of 1976 by the “Frisco Lines”. The “second unit”, 2600, was built in November of 1965, by the “Santa Fe”. This is exactly backwards of what your witness mentioned. Secondly, both locomotives are turbo-charged. I’m not denying this train was likely the culprit of the fire, but details are incorrect.
Hi David: Thank you for this information. As the facts you’re taking exception with are quoted verbatim from the DNR report, we won’t change that information. But your point is well taken and perhaps something investigators will end up clarifying. Thank you for reading Columbia Insight. —Editor
To be more correct, the 2322 is an EMD GP38-2 with a non-turbocharged 16-645E engine, while the 2600 would be a rebuilt EMD GP35 with a turbocharged 16-567 engine. The 2600 is older, but rebuilt.
That the DNR cannot get it right brings into question how good of a job DNR did in investigating the incident.
Hi Patrick: Good points. Though to be fair to DNR, the report it put together is 22 pages long. The small piece used in our story is taken from just one of many interviews and sources cited in the report, which we hope will be made publicly available soon. Thanks. —Editor
We need to accept that fires are going to happen and we will never prevent all fire starts. Whether it be trailer wheel bearing, powerlines, fireworks, people firing bullets at targets set on grassy slopes, lightning, or other. The basic fire fighting/prevention plan we have had for the last 100+ years pretty much creates the conditions for the hottest most dangerous fires possible and needs to be completely redone. For a place like the Washington side of the gorge near White Salmon where this fire occurred we should be down burning the cliff faces every few years in May, June, or early July to get rid of the build up of flammable materials on the forest floor rather than doing nothing and then having to spend huge amounts of money every ten years or so fighting a hard to control wildfire at a time not of our choosing.
With houses at top of cliff and slopes of 80-100%, DNR would never do a prescribed burn there. No way to put in a fireline and way too dangerous.
Jurgen Hess, former US Forest Service manager and current wildfire photographer
More insight into the attitudes at play among the major rail carriers like Union Pacific and BNSF:
https://www.propublica.org/article/railroad-safety-union-pacific-csx-bnsf-trains-freight